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price and relative output levels is used. We find that, once sampling uncertainty and serial 
correlation are accounted for, there is little statistical evidence that the RMB is undervalued. 
The result is robust to various choices of country samples and sample periods, as well as to 
the inclusion of control variables. 
JEL Code: F31, F41. 




Department of Economics 
University of California, Santa Cruz 
USA – CA 95064 
cheung@ucsc.edu 
Menzie D. Chinn 
LaFollette School of Public Affairs 
University of Wisconsin 
1180 Observatory Drive 




Graduate School of Systems and Information Engineering 
University of Tsukuba 
Tennodai 1-1-1 
Japan - Tsukuba, Ibaraki 
efujii@sk.tsukuba.ac.jp 
January 2007 
An earlier version of the paper was circulated under the title “Why the Renminbi Might Be 
Overvalued (But Probably Isn’t).” We thank Michael Klein (whose suggestion inspired the 
title), Hoyt Bleakley, Joshua Aizenman, Henning Bohn, Robert Dekle, Mick Devereux, 
Michael Dooley, Sebastian Edwards, Barry Eichengreen, Michael Frömmel, Reuven Glick, 
Linda Goldberg, Galina Hale, Koichi Hamada, Randall Henning, Owen Humpage, Juann 
Hung, Gary Jefferson, Michael Klein, Akira Kohsaka, Inpyo Lee, Jaewoo Lee, Ron 
McKinnon, Eiji Ogawa, Brian Pinto, Eswar Prasad, Aris Protopapadakis, Andy Rose, Margot 
Schüller, Ulrich Volz, Shang-Jin Wei, Tom Willett, , and participants at conferences at the 
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, the Hamburg Institute of International Economics, 
the ACEAS panel at the ASSA 2006 Meetings, the 2006 conference “WTO, China, and the 
Asian Economy,” the 2006 HKEA Biannual Conference, the 2006 JIMF-SCCIE conference, 
and the CEANA/ASSA section at the 2007 ASSA Meetings for their helpful comments on the 
current and earlier versions of this paper. Dickson Tam, Jian Wang and Noriko Inakura 
provided excellent assistance in collecting data. Financial support of faculty research funds of 
the University of California at Santa Cruz, the University of Wisconsin, the Japan Center for 
Economic Research grant, and the Nomura Foundation for Social Science research grant is 
gratefully acknowledged. The views expressed are solely those of the authors, and do not 
necessarily represent the views and opinions of institutions the authors are, or have been, 
associated with.  
  1
1. Introduction 
China’s currency, the Renminbi (RMB), has occupied a central role in the ongoing debate 
over the source of global current account imbalances. In this paper, we step back from the 
debates over the merits of one exchange rate regime versus another and whether a currency 
realignment is desirable (although our conclusions will necessarily inform the debate over what 
the appropriate actions might be). Rather, we focus the discussion of currency misalignment in 
terms of economic theory and empirics; in particular, we focus on the difficulty in measuring the 
“equilibrium real exchange rate” and on quantifying the uncertainty surrounding the 
measurement of the level of the equilibrium. In so doing, we sharpen our definition of what 
constitutes currency misalignment, at the cost of restricting the generality of our conclusions. 
Specifically, we exploit a well-known relationship between deviations from absolute 
purchasing power parity and real per capita income using panel regression methods.  By placing 
the RMB in the context of this well-known empirical relationship exhibited by a large number of 
developing and developed countries, over a long time horizon, this approach addresses the 
question of where China’s real exchange rate stands relative to the “equilibrium” level.  In 
addition to calculating the numerical magnitude of the degree of misalignment, we assess the 
estimates in the context of statistical uncertainty. In this respect, we extend the standard practice 
of considering both economic and statistical significance in coefficient estimates to the 
prediction aspect.  
We also extend the analysis by allowing for heterogeneity across country groupings and 
time periods. After conducting various robustness checks, we conclude that although the point 
estimates indicate the RMB is undervalued in almost all samples, in almost no case is the 
deviation statistically significant, and indeed, when serial correlation is accounted for, the extent 
of misalignment is not even statistically significant at the 50% level. These findings highlight the 
great degree of uncertainty surrounding empirical estimates of “equilibrium real exchange rates”, 
thereby underscoring the difficulty in accurately assessing the degree of RMB undervaluation.  
  We further assess the robustness of the results in the presence of several conditioning 
variables. These additional factors include demographic variables, measures of trade openness, 
policy factors such as the extent of capital controls, and institutional factors. While these 
conditioning variables exert significant effects, their inclusion does not change the basic 
message: the RMB appears to be undervalued, but not by a statistically significant margin.  
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2.   Preliminary  Discussion 
2.1  A Brief Literature Review 
At the heart of the debate over the right way of determining the appropriate exchange rate 
level are contrasting ideas of what constitutes an equilibrium exchange rate, what time frame the 
equilibrium condition pertains to, and, not least, what econometric method to implement.
1 Some 
short cuts have been used so often that some forget that they are short cuts.  
Most of the extant studies fall into some familiar categories, either relying upon some 
form of relative purchasing power parity (PPP) or cost competitiveness calculation, the modeling 
of deviations from absolute PPP,  a composite model incorporating several channels of effects 
(sometimes called behavioral equilibrium exchange rate models), or flow equilibrium models.
2  
The relative PPP comparisons are the easiest to make, in terms of numerical calculation. 
On the other hand, relative PPP is uninformative about how a country’s exchange rate stands 
relative to others. 
Bosworth (2004), Frankel (2005), Coudert and Couharde (2005), and Cairns (2005b) 
estimate the relationship between the deviation from absolute PPP and relative per capita 
income. All obtain similar results regarding the relationship between the two variables (although 
Coudert and Couharde fail to detect this link for the RMB in their time series analysis).  
Zhang (2001), Wang (2004), and Funke and Rahn (2005) implement what could broadly 
be described as behavioral equilibrium exchange rate (BEER) specifications.
3 These models 
incorporate a variety of channels through which the real exchange rate is affected. Since each 
author selects different variables to include, the implied misalignments will necessarily vary. In 
addition, these approaches will fail to identify if a currency is misaligned relative to another 
country’s for the same reason that relative PPP fails to do so – because they typically rely upon 
price indices but not actual prices. 
Other approaches center on flow equilibria, considering savings and investment behavior 
and the resulting implied current account. The equilibrium exchange rate is derived from the 
implied medium term current account using import and export elasticities. In the IMF’s 
                                                 
1   One relevant work is Hinkle and Montiel (1999). 
2   See Table 1 of Cheung, Chinn and Fujii (forthcoming) for a typology of these different 
approaches. 
3   Also known as BEERs, a composite of exchange rate models.  
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“macroeconomic approach”, the “norms” are estimated, in the spirit of Chinn and Prasad (2003). 
Wang (2004) discusses the difficulties in using this approach for China but does not present 
estimates of misalignment based upon this framework. Coudert and Couharde (2005) implement 
a similar approach. Finally, the external balances approach relies upon assessments of the 
persistent components of the balance of payments condition (Goldstein, 2004; Bosworth, 2004). 
This last set of approaches is perhaps most useful for conducting short-term analyses. But the 
wide dispersion in implied misalignments reflects the difficulties in making judgments about 
what constitutes persistent capital flows. For instance, Prasad and Wei (2005), examining the 
composition of capital inflows into and out of China, argue that much of the reserve 
accumulation that has occurred in recent years is due to speculative inflows; hence, the degree of 
misalignment is small.
4  
In his survey, Cairns (2005a) observes that studies implementing an absolute PPP 
methodology result in the greatest degree of estimated undervaluation. Those implementing 
either relative PPP or flow equilibrium approaches find smaller estimates of undervaluation.
5  
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Figure 1: Real Chinese exchange rate, in logs (Official and “Adjusted”) and trends 
                                                 
4   Moreover, such judgments based upon flow criteria must condition their conclusions on 
the existence of effective capital controls. This is an obvious—and widely acknowledged — 
point, but one that bears repeating and, indeed, is a point that we will return to at the end of this 
paper. 
5   Dunaway and Li (2005) made a similar observation.  
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To highlight the drawbacks of this oft-used relative PPP approach, we examine briefly 
what this methodology says about the RMB. Figure 1 depicts the official exchange rate series 
from January 1987 to May 2006, deflated by the US and Chinese CPI’s. The rate is expressed so 
higher values mean a stronger Chinese currency (the units of currency are denoted as CNY, for 
Chinese Yuan). In line with expectations, in the years since the East Asian crisis, the RMB has 
experienced a downward decline in value.  
However, as with the case with many economies experiencing transitions from controlled 
to partially decontrolled capital accounts and from dual to unified exchange rate regimes, there is 
some dispute over what exchange rate measure to use. It turns out that in the years leading up to 
1994, increasingly large amounts of RMB transactions were taking place at “swap rates” – rather 
than the official rate – so that the 1994 “mega-devaluation” is actually better described as a 
unification of different rates of exchange (Fernald, Edison, and Loungani, 1999). The “adjusted” 
rate in Figure 1 is a weighted average of the official and the swap rates.  
In the early warning system literature that developed in the wake of the financial crises of 
the 1990’s, a typical measure of currency misalignment was the deviation from a deterministic 
trend. Using the “adjusted” rate, and fitting a linear time trend, one finds a modest 
undervaluation in the May of 2006 of 1.3%, contrasting slightly with the 5% overvaluation 
implied by the official exchange rate.  
In general, trade weighted exchange rates provide better measures of relative prices. 
However, using this same methodology on this exchange rate does not necessarily clarify 
matters.
6 Figure 2 depicts the IMF’s trade weighted effective exchange rate index, and a fitted 
linear. One finds that focusing on the deviations from a simple trend indicates the RMB is 30% 
overvalued. Of course, a quick glance at the data indicates that a simple trend is much too 
simplistic a characterization. Suppose instead that one assumed that the relevant period was 1987 
onward; then a flat trend and zero misalignment would be the determination. The fact that 
working with simple straight line extrapolations can lead to such diverging conclusions suggests 
that we need to take a closer look at where the Chinese currency should stand, both over time 
and across countries. 
                                                 
6   As a matter of principal, trade weighted rates are to be preferred to bilateral rates since 













Figure 2: Real trade weighted value of RMB, in logs, and trend. 
 
3.   Absolute Purchasing Power Parity 
3.1   The Real Exchange Rate – Income Relationship 
As a first cut, we appeal to a simple, and apparently robust, relationship between the real 
exchange rate and per capita income. We will then elaborate the analysis by stratifying the data 
along other dimensions (level of development, time period), and by adding in other variables that 
might alter one’s assessment of the fundamental equilibrium level of the exchange rate. 
First, let us consider the basic framework of analysis. Consider the law of one price, 
which states that the price of a single good should be equalized in common currency terms 
(expressed in logs): 
*
, , t i t t i p s p + =           ( 1 )  
where  t s  is the log exchange rate,  t i p ,  is the log price of good i at time t, and the asterisk denotes 
the foreign country variable. Summing over all goods, and assuming the weights associated with 
each good are the same in both the home country and foreign country basket, one then obtains 
the absolute purchasing power parity condition: 
*
t t t p s p + =           ( 2 )  
where for simplicity assume p is a arithmetic average of individual log prices. As is well known, 
if the weights differ between home and foreign country baskets (let’s say production bundles), 
then even if the law of one price holds, absolute purchasing power parity need not hold.   
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  The “price level” variable in the Penn World Tables (Summers and Heston, 1991), and 
other purchasing power parity exchange rates, attempt to circumvent this problem by using 
prices (not price indices) of goods, and calculating the aggregate price level using the same 
weights. Assume for the moment that this can be accomplished, but that some share of the basket 
(α) is nontradable (denoted by N subscript), and the remainder is tradable (denoted by T 
subscript). Then: 
  t T t N t p p p , , ) 1 ( α α − + =         (3) 
By simple manipulation, one finds that the “real exchange rate” is given by: 








t T t N t T t N t T t T t t t t t p p p p p p s p p s q − + − − + − = + − ≡ α α    (4) 
Rewriting, and indicating the first term in (parentheses), the intercountry price of tradables, as 




, , , t T t N t T t N p p p p − − − , leads 
to the following rewriting of (4): 
t t T t q q αω − = ,         (4’) 
This expression indicates that the real exchange rate can appreciate as changes occur in the 
relative price of traded goods between countries, or as the relative price of nontradables rises in 
one country, relative to another. In principle, economic factors can affect one or both.  
Most models of the real exchange rate can be categorized according to which specific 
relative price serves as the object of focus. If the relative price of nontradables is key, then the 
resulting models – in a small country context – have been termed “dependent economy” (Salter, 
1959, and Swan, 1960) or “Scandinavian”
 model. In the former case, demand side factors drive 
shifts in the relative price of nontradables. In the latter, productivity levels and the nominal 
exchange rate determine the nominal wage rate, and hence the price level and the relative price 
of nontradables. In this latter context, the real exchange rate is a function of productivity 
(Krueger, 1983: 157). Consequently, the two sets of models both focus on the relative 
nontradables price, but differ in their focus on the source of shifts in this relative price. Since the 
home economy is small relative to the world economy (hence, one is working with a one-country 
model), the tradable price is pinned down by the rest-of-the-world supply of traded goods. 
Hence, the “real exchange rate” in this case is (p
N-p
T). 
By far dominant in this category are those that center on the relative price of 
nontradables. These include the specifications based on the approaches of Balassa (1964) and  
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Samuelson (1964) that model the relative price of nontradables as a function of sectoral 
productivity differentials, including Hsieh (1982), Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (1999), and 
Chinn (2000a). They also include those approaches that include demand side determinants of the 
relative price, such as that of DeGregorio and Wolf (1994). They observe that if consumption 
preferences are not homothetic and factors are not perfectly free to move intersectorally, changes 
in per capita income may result shifts in the relative price of nontradables.  
This perspective provides the key rationale for the well-known positive cross-sectional 
relationship between relative price (the inverse of q, i.e., -q) and relative per capita income 
levels. We exploit this relationship to determine whether the Chinese currency is undervalued. 
Obviously, this approach is not novel; it has been implemented recently by Coudert and 
Couharde (2005) and Frankel (2006). However, we will expand this approach along several 
dimensions. First, we augment the approach by incorporating the time series dimension.
7 Second, 
we explicitly characterize the uncertainty surrounding our determinations of currency 
misalignment. Third, we examine the stability of the relative price and relative per capita income 
relationship using a) subsamples of certain country groups and time periods, and b) control 
variables. 
Before proceeding further, it is important to be explicit about the type of equilibrium we 
are associating with our measure of the “normal” exchange rate level.  Theoretically, the 
equilibrium exchange rate in the Balassa-Samuelson approach is the one that is consistent with 
both internal and external balances. In reality, however, internal and external balance is not 
guaranteed. Thus, the estimated exchange rate measure is properly interpreted as a long-run 
measure and is ill-suited (on its own) to analyzing short run phenomena. As a remedy, we 
include control variables that are relevant for (short-run) variations in internal and external 
balances in the subsequent analyses.
8  
 
                                                 
7   Coudert and Couharde (2005) implement the absolute PPP regression on a cross-section, 
while their panel estimation relies upon estimating the relationship between the relative price 
level to relative tradables to nontradables price indices.  
8    Frankel (2006) discusses whether one can speak of an “equilibrium exchange rate” when 
there is more than one sector to consider.   
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3.2   The Basic Bivariate  Results 
  We compile a large data set encompassing up to 160 countries over the 1975-2004 
period. Most of the data are drawn from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
(WDI).
 Because some data are missing, the panel is unbalanced. The Appendix gives a greater 
detail on the data used in this subsection and elsewhere.  
Extending Frankel’s (2006) cross-section approach, we estimate the real exchange rate-
income relationship using a pooled time-series cross-section (OLS) regression, where all 
variables are expressed in terms relative to the US; 
it it it u y q + + = 1 0 β β ,          ( 5 )  
where q is expressed in real terms relative to the US price level, y is real per capita income 
relative to the US.
9 The results are reported in the first two columns of Table 1, for cases in 
which we measure relative per capita income in either USD exchange rates or PPP-based 
exchange rates. 
One characteristic of estimating a pooled OLS regression is that it forces the intercept 
term to be the same across countries, and assumes that the error term is distributed identically 
over the entire sample. Because this is something that should be tested, rather than assumed, we 
also estimated random effects and fixed effects regressions. The former assumes that the 
individual specific error is uncorrelated with the right hand side variables, while the latter is 
efficient when this correlation is non-zero.
10 
Random effects regressions do not yield substantially different results from those 
obtained using pooled OLS. Interestingly, when allowing the within and between coefficients to 
differ, we do find differing effects. In particular, with US$ based per capita GDP, the within 
effect is much stronger than the between. This divergence is likely picking up short term effects, 
where output growth is correlated with other variables pushing up currency values. This pattern, 
however, is not present in results derived from the PPP-based output data. 
                                                 
9   β0 can take on currency specific values if a fixed effects specification is implemented. 
Similarly, the error term is composed of a currency specific and aggregate error if the pooled 
OLS specification is dropped. 
10   Since the price levels being used are comparable across countries, in principle there is no 
need to incorporate country-specific constants as in fixed effects or random effects regressions. 
In addition, fixed effects estimates are biased in the presence of serial correlation, which is 
documented in the subsequent analysis.  
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  Interestingly, the estimated elasticity of the price level with respect to per capita income 
does not appear to be particularly sensitive to measurements of per capita income. In all cases,   
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Table 1: The panel estimation results of the real exchange rate – income relationship 
 




































































2  0.496  0.617 0.763  0.496  0.349  0.413 0.754  0.349 0.012  0.389 0.021 0.012 
F-test  
statistic 
   29.468**      42.647**     1.218*   
Hausman 
test statistic 
     11.873**      0.167      39.384**
Number of 
observations
4018      4018       3958       
 
Notes: The data covers 160 countries over the maximum of a thirty-years period from 1975 to 2004. The panel is unbalanced due to some missing 
observations. ** and * indicate 1% and 5% levels of significance, respectively. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are given in parentheses 
underneath coefficient estimates. For the fixed effects models, the F-test statistics are reported for the null hypothesis of the equality of the 
constants across all countries in the sample. For the random effects models, the Hausman test statistics test for the independence between the time-
invariant country-specific effects and the regressor.  
The third column labeled (Prais-Winsten) gives estimates from data with serial correlation removed using the Prais-Winsten method. The AR1 
coefficient estimate for the Prais-Winsten transformation is 0.951. 
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the elasticity estimate is always around 0.25-0.39, which compares favorably with Frankel’s 
(2006) 1990 and 2000 year cross-section estimates of 0.38 and 0.32, respectively.
11   
  One of the key emphases of our analysis is the central role accorded the quantification of 
the uncertainty surrounding the estimates. That is, in addition to estimating the economic 
magnitude of the implied misalignments, we also assess whether the implied misalignments are 
statistically different from zero. In Figures 3 and 4, we plot the actual and resulting predicted 
rates and standard error bands. To simply presentation, we focus on results derived from the 
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Figure 3: The rate of RMB misalignment based on the pooled OLS estimates with the USD-based per 
capita income.  
                                                 
11   Note that, in addition to differences in the sample, our estimates differ from Frankel’s in 
that we measure each country’s (logged) real GDP per capita in terms relative to the US rather 
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Figure 4: The rate of RMB misalignment based on the pooled OLS estimates with the PPP-based per 
capita income. 
 
It is interesting to consider the path that the RMB has traced out in the graph. It begins 
the sample as overvalued, and over the next three decades it moves toward the predicted 
equilibrium value and then overshoots, so that, by 2004, it is substantially undervalued — by 
53% in level terms (greater in log terms). It is indeed a puzzle that the RMB path is different 
from the one predicted by the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis. In comparing the observations at 
1975 and 2004, we found that countries including Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore also 
experienced an increase in their income but a decrease in their real exchange rates. On the other 
hand, Japan – a country typically used to illustrate the Balassa-Samuelson effect, has a positive 
real exchange rate – income relationship. The phenomenon warrants further analysis in a future 
study.  
In this context, we make two observations about these misalignment estimates. First, the 
RMB has been persistently undervalued by this criterion since the mid-1980s, even in 1997 and 
1998, when China was lauded for its refusal to devalue its currency despite the threat to its 
competitive position.   
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Second, and perhaps most importantly, in 2004, the RMB was more than one standard 
error—but less than two standard errors—away from the predicted value, which in the present 
context is interpreted as the “equilibrium” value. In other words, by the standard statistical 
criterion that applied economists commonly appeal to, the RMB is not undervalued (as of 2004) 
in a statistically significant sense. The wide dispersion of observations in the scatter plots should 
give pause to those who would make strong statements regarding the exact degree of 
misalignment.  
 
3.3   Controlling for Serial Correlation 
Notice that the deviations from the conditional mean are persistent; that is, deviations 
from the real exchange rate - income relationship identified by the regression are persistent, or 
exhibit serial correlation. It has an important implication for interpreting the degree of 
uncertainty surrounding these measures of misalignment. Frankel (2006) makes a similar 
observation, noting that half of the deviation of the RMB from the 1990 conditional mean exists 
in 2000. We estimate the autoregressive coefficient in our sample at approximately 0.89 to 0.91 
(derived from USD- and PPP-based per capita income figures, respectively) on an annual basis. 
A simple, ad hoc adjustment based upon the latter estimate suggests that the standard error of the 
regression should be adjusted upward by a factor equal to [1/(1-
2 ˆ ρ )]
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Figure 5: PPP-based real income, pooled OLS estimates with ad-hoc AR1 adjustment. 
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To provide a temporal dimension of the estimated misalignment, we trace the evolution 
of the RMB level over time, its predicted value, and the associated confidence bands adjusted to 
account for the serial correlation in Figure 5. The figure shows a striking feature – after 
controlling for serial correlation, the actual value of the RMB is always within one standard error 
prediction interval surrounding the (predicted) equilibrium value in the last 20 plus years! 
Combining this result and the large data dispersion observed in Figure 4, we have the impression 
that the data are not informative for a sharp misalignment inference – not just for the recent 
period but for the entire sample period. 
While the ad hoc adjustment procedure offers a more accurate assessment of the degree 
of uncertainty surrounding the predicted level of misalignment, it gives no information on the 
estimated real exchange rate-relative income relationship that is free of serial correlation effects. 
In order to obtain estimates that are statistically correct in the presence of serial correlation, we 
implemented a panel version of the Prais-Winsten procedure.
12 The results are reported in the 
third column of Table 1. 
The pooled OLS estimate using PPP-based per capita income indicates a short run 
elasticity of 0.15, which is about one-half of the estimate without the serial correlation 
adjustment. The implied rate of adjustment is about 0.93 and the implied long-run elasticity is an 
implausibly high value of around 2. Relaxing the assumption that the errors are the same across 
time and individual countries (i.e., the random effects regression), we obtain a smaller short-run 
and hence long-run elasticity – 0.13 and 1.8, respectively. Since the Hausman tests rejects the 
orthogonality of the constant and the right hand side variable, we also consider the fixed effects 
regression results. These indicate the cross-country elasticity as being 0.4 (that is the “between” 
effect), and the short run elasticity 0.04 (not significant).  
                                                 
12   In essence, the Prais-Winsten method is an efficient procedure that incorporates serial 
correlation into the estimation process. We also implemented the Arellano-Bond approach that 
introduces lagged dependent variables into the model to account for serial correlation. The 
validity of the Arellano-Bond depends on the use of “good” instruments and the assumption that 
the number of time series observation is greater than the number of cross-sectional variables. In 
the current case, the choice of instruments is a practical issue and the time series dimension is 
smaller than the number of economies. In any case, the Arellano-Bond result is qualitatively 
similar to the one based on the ad hoc AR1 adjustment – the procedure gives a much larger 
standard error for a comparable estimate of undervaluation estimate given in Figure 3. These 
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Figure 6: PPP-based real income, the Prais-Winsten estimates  
 
Figure 6 shows the predicted RMB exchange rate based upon the pooled OLS estimates. 
Two observations are in order. First, for most of the sample period, the actual RMB value is 
within the one standard error prediction band – that is, the currency is insignificantly different 
from its predicted equilibrium value. The result is similar to the one depicted in Figure 5. 
Second, while the actual RMB value has been slightly below its predicted value since the 1997 
Asian financial crisis year, the two values virtually have converged by 2004 and there is little 
indication of undervaluation. In fact, the 2004 actual value slightly exceeds the predicted one; 
suggesting an overvaluation of 0.2 percent albeit statistically insignificant.  The surprising result 
is a consequence of taking serial correlation seriously – that is dealing with the high degree of 
persistence in the real exchange rate over time.  
That being said, most of the time, the actual exchange rate is within about one standard 
error of the predicted, suggesting that the case for overvaluation is about as strong (or weak) as 
the case for undervaluation. In other words, we can have little certitude about RMB 
misalignment using this oft-used cross-country relationship between the real exchange rate and 
per capita income, once issues of serial correlation are explicitly accounted for.  
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It is well-known that serial correlation, if not appropriately corrected for, can lead to 
biased estimates and unreliable inferences. In the current exercise (illustrated in Figures 4 and 5), 
serial correlation is handled using two different approaches and yet yield similar inferences 
regarding RMB misalignment. Despite the apparent RMB undervaluation, both cases show that 
adjustment for serial correlation effects results in a much weaker case for a significantly 
undervalued RMB. In the next two sections, we shift our attention to other factors that might 
mediate the real exchange rate-relative income relationship. 
 
4.  Analyses of Subsamples 
  In the current and subsequent sections, we consider several variations of the basic 
bivariate structure in order to assess the robustness of our findings. Again, to simplify 
presentation and conserve space, we focus on results pertaining to PPP-based output data. In 
general, the results are quite robust to the choice of output data. The omitted results are available 
upon request. 
  
4.1  Developed/Developing and Income Stratifications 
In Table 2, we report the results obtained from developed and developing countries. 
Interestingly, we find that the pooled OLS estimate is much larger for the developed countries 
than for the developing. This is somewhat surprising, given the widespread belief that Balassa-
Samuelson effects are more pronounced in developing countries. Furthermore, the F-test 
indicates that the GDP effects are significantly different across the two country groups. 
We investigate further by estimating random effects models. For developed countries, the 
GDP effect under the random effects model is substantially smaller than the one under the OLS 
setting; 0.19 versus 0.75. The change in the case of developing countries is much less dramatic, 
and the random effects model gives a stronger GDP effect. Interestingly, the random effects 
specification reverses the relative size of the GDP effect so that now the slope coefficient is 
greater in developing countries.  Since the Hausman test fails to reject the exogeneity 
assumption, we can be relatively confident that these values are representative.   
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Table 2: The panel estimation results for developed versus developing country samples 
 













































2  0.330  0.665 0.569 0.330 0.192 0.266 0.670 0.192 
F-test  
statistic 
   18.536**     39.097**   
Hausman 
test statistic 
    0.000     0.453 
Number of 
observations 
600     3229     
 
 
Notes: The PPP-based real per capita income is used. The data covers 20 developed and 124 developing countries over the maximum of a thirty-
years period from 1975 to 2004. The panel is unbalanced due to some missing observations. ** and * indicate 1% and 5% levels of significance, 
respectively. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are given in parentheses underneath coefficient estimates. For the fixed effects models, the 
F-test statistics are reported for the null hypothesis of the equality of the constants across all countries in the sample. For the random effects 
models, the Hausman test statistics test for the independence between the time-invariant country-specific effects and the regressor. The F-test for 
the equality of the slope coefficients between the two samples gives a test statistic of 119.931, which rejects the null hypothesis of equality. 
  18
Using the developing country pooled OLS estimates, we find that the RMB is 51% 
misaligned as of 2004 (see Figure 7). However, the actual rate is still within two standard errors 
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Figure 7: PPP-based real income, pooled OLS estimates with the less developed country sample 
 
  When we break the sample into finer categories – namely into high, middle, and low 
income groupings – we find a pattern wherein the pooled OLS estimates are highest in the 
highest income group, and declines with income grouping (Table 3). A formal F-test confirms 
that the estimated GDP effects are significantly different across these income groups. 
  Moving to the random effects specifications, which appear to be appropriate for the high 
and middle income groupings, one finds that the elasticities are about the same, at 0.16 versus 
0.14. Table 4 also shows the between effects’ estimate of the exchange rate-income elasticity of -
0.26 for low income countries, while the within effect is about a half. In other words, for low 
income countries, there is substantial variation over time due to income changes. 
Using the middle income country estimates, we estimate the extent of RMB 





Table 3: The panel estimation results by income level stratifications 
 




































































2  0.312 0.564 0.636  0.312 0.096 0.106 0.650  0.096 0.005  0.062  0.564  0.005 
F-test 
statistic   
  26.981**     40.087**       33.207**   
Hausman 
test statistic 
     0.000       0.168     34.445** 
Number  of 
observations 
875      1799      1330       
 
Notes: The PPP-based real per capita income is used. The data covers 31 high income countries, 74 middle income countries, and 54 low income countries 
over the maximum of a thirty year period from 1975 to 2004. The panel is unbalanced due to some missing observations. ** and * indicate 1% and 5% levels 
of significance, respectively. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are given in parentheses underneath coefficient estimates. For the fixed effects models, 
the F-test statistics are reported for the null hypothesis of the equality of the constants across all countries in the sample. For the random effects models, the 
Hausman test statistics test for the independence between the time-invariant country-specific effects and the regressor. The F-test for the equality of the slope 
coefficients between the samples based on the pooled OLS estimates gives test statistics of 98.483 for high income countries versus middle income countries, 
147.143 for high income countries versus low income countries, and 58.053 for middle income countries versus low income countries. In all cases, the null 
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Figure 8: PPP-based real income, pooled OLS estimates with the middle income country sample 
 
4.2  The East Asian Economies 
One question that stands out in our view is whether East Asia as a whole is distinguished 
from other countries in terms of its experience with real exchange rates. In addition, we have 
some a priori idea that Africa at the very least behaves in a different way than other developing 
countries. Hence, we also stratify the sample by regional grouping. The estimation results in 
Table 4 and the F-test statistics in its Notes section provide some evidence that there are indeed 
significant regional differences. 
  Asia and Latin America do not differ substantially in terms of the pooled OLS estimates, 
while Africa’s coefficient is somewhat lower. The random effects specification is rejected by 
Hausman tests; looking to the fixed effects regressions, we find the pattern mentioned in the 
previous section repeated. That is, in the relatively higher income Asia grouping, the between 
coefficient is fairly high, while the within is actually negative.
13 The Latin America grouping 
exhibits about equally sized coefficients, while for Africa, the within coefficient dwarfs the 
nonsignificant between coefficient. In sum, we conclude that it is important to differentiate 
between country groupings. 
Using the Asia-specific coefficients, we find a 49% undervaluation for RMB, once again 
within the two standard error band (See Figure 9).
                                                 
13   See Devereux (1999) for an early observation of this pattern.  
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Table 4: The panel estimation results by geographical stratifications 
 





































































2  0.537 0.724 0.824 0.537 0.206 0.255 0.705 0.206 0.015 -.010 0.546 0.015 
F-test 
statistic  
  44.594**     50.684**     32.909**   
Hausman 
test statistic 




563     884     1147     
 
Notes: The PPP-based real per capita income is used. The data covers 22 Asian countries, 31 Latin American countries, and 43 African countries over the 
maximum of a thirty year period from 1975 to 2004. The panels are unbalanced due to some missing observations. (The country classifications are as defined 
by the WDI. Asia does not include “South Asia”, and Africa does not include “Middle East and North Africa”.) ** and * indicate 1% and 5% levels of 
significance, respectively. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are given in parentheses underneath coefficient estimates. For the fixed effects models, the 
F-test statistics are reported for the null hypothesis of the equality of the constants across all countries in the sample. For the random effects models, the 
Hausman test statistics test for the independence between the time-invariant country-specific effects and the regressor. The F-test for the equality of the slope 
coefficients between the samples based on the pooled OLS estimates gives test statistics of 1.351 for Asia versus Latin America, 37.500 for Latin America 
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Figure 9: PPP-based real income, pooled OLS estimates with the East Asian country sample. 
 
4.3 Different  Sample  Periods   
A third dimension along which to split the sample is along the time dimension. In 
particular, we use a break point of 1989/90, approximately halfway through the full sample.  
 
  Table 5: The panel estimation results for the 1975-1989 and 1990-2004 sub-samples 
 
















































2  0.209 0.251 0.781 0.209 0.  459  0.529 0.865 0.459 
F-test 
statistic  
  36.279**     43.766**   
Hausman 
test statistic 
    1.266      20.287** 
Number of 
observations 
1757     2261     
 
Notes: The PPP-based real per capita income is used. The data covers 131 countries over the 1975-1989 
period, and 159 countries over the 1990-2004 period. The panels are unbalanced due to some missing 
observations. **, * and 
# indicate 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively.  
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Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are given in parentheses underneath coefficient estimates. For 
the fixed effects models, the F-test statistics are reported for the null hypothesis of the equality of the 
constants across all countries in the sample. For the random effects models, the Hausman test statistics 
test for the independence between the time-invariant country-specific effects and the regressor. The F-test 
for the equality of the slope coefficients between the two sub-samples gives a test statistic of 183.677, 
which rejects the null hypothesis of equality. 
 
The results reported in Table 5 are quite interesting. According to the OLS results, the 
slope coefficient is larger, by about 75%, in the more recent period.
14 However, this result does 
not stand up to allowing for random effects. Since the Hausman test rejects in the second 
subsample, we discuss the fixed effects estimates, which indicate the between effect has indeed 
been quite strong over the last fifteen years, while the within effect is essentially zero. That is 
important, as we consider the fact that Chinese per capita income has been rising rapidly over 
time. These results suggest that the average per capita income is what is important in assessing 
under or overvaluation. Using the pooled OLS estimate results, we find the RMB is undervalued 
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Figure 10: PPP-based real income, pooled OLS estimates with the 1990-2004 sample 
 
  Although our sample stratification scheme is not exhaustive, the results so far inspire two 
general observations. One is that the GDP effect in the real exchange rate-relative income 
                                                 
14   The slope coefficient estimates from year-by-year regressions show a similar upward 
trend. The slope coefficient starts with a low of 0.14 at 1975 and moves up gradually to the high 
of 0.39 at 1995. Then it stays quite steady around the level of 0.36 for the rest of the sample.  
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regression varies across country groups and across historical periods. Second, the results from 
these subsamples do not change the basic message developed in the last section – that is, the case 
for RMB undervaluation is not that strong once sampling uncertainty is taken into consideration. 
Further, when we accounted for serial correlation in the estimation process, the magnitude of 
undervaluation is substantially reduced. 
 
5.  Beyond the Bivariate Framework 
5.1  Demographics, Policy, and Financial Development 
One remarkable feature of the previous results is the finding that the RMB is almost 
always undervalued by close to 50% in log terms – regardless of the sample used to make the 
assessment; moreover the null of no undervaluation cannot typically be rejected. These findings 
could be driven by the fact that the bivariate framework does not explicitly consider (short-run) 
internal and external imbalances which might be associated with certain variables. In this 
context, the serial correlation in the error term could signify the omission of serially correlated 
explanatory variables. Even though we can econometrically fix the serial correlation problem 
(see Section 3.3), it might be preferable to identify the relevant variables, in order to resolve the 
problem in economic terms. These points suggest that one might want to broaden the set of 
determinants. 
Once one moves away from a simple world where the per capita income differential is a 
proxy for Balassa-Samuelson effects, a whole universe of additional determinants suggest 
themselves. In particular, if the income variable proxies not only for productivity differentials, 
but also non-homotheticity of preferences, savings propensities, or impediments to the free flow 
of capital, then one would wish to include variables that pertain to these factors. Hence we 
augment the relative per capita income with demographics – under 14 and over 65 dependency 
ratios – and with an index of capital account openness developed by Chinn and Ito (2006). We 
include a government deficit variable because Chinn and Prasad (2003) find that it explains part 
of current account balances over the medium term. Finally, financial deepening is proxied by an 
M2/GDP ratio.  
The results are reported in the first column of Table 6. Interestingly, the elasticity of the 
price level with respect to relative income is not drastically altered, relative to the original full- 
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sample bivariate regression estimates (Table 1). Moreover, the additional variables enter in with 
statistical significance (with the exception of the government deficit variable). 
 
Table 6: Estimation with control variables 
 
 
demographics, policy, and financial 
development 


















0.257**    
(0.013) 
0.236**    
(0.045) 
0.286**    
(0.034) 
0.264**    
(0.022) 
0.254**    
(0.011) 
0.222**    
(0.042) 
0.185**    
(0.042) 




0.302**    
(0.036) 
0.373**    
(0.116) 
0.035      
(0.056) 
0.123**    
(0.050)      
Population 
over 65 
0.340**    
(0.035) 
0.289*     
(0.140) 
0.422**    
(0.083) 
0.283**    
(0.079)      
Capital acct. 
openness 
0.127**    
(0.013) 
0.112      
(0.069) 
0.042**    
(0.015) 
0.059**    
(0.014) 
0.040     
(0.037) 
0.058     
(0.209) 
0.050     
(0.033) 




0.000      
(0.000) 
0.000*      
(0.000) 
0.000      
(0.000) 
0.000     
(0.000)      
M2/GDP  0.360**    
(0.028) 
0.615**    
(0.143) 
0.244**    
(0.036) 
0.246**    
(0.038)      
Corruption      
0.214** 
(0.042) 
0.273     
(0.202) 
0.107**    
(0.029) 
0.131**    
(0.031) 
Interaction 
term      









Constant  -.995**     
(0.070) 
-1.234**   
(0.241)    -.654**     
(0.120) 
-.419**     
(0.040) 
-.553**     
(0.189)    -.334**     
(0.057) 
Adjusted R
2  0.520  0.604   0.790   0.509   0.517  0.605  0.834   0.505 
F-test statistic        26.697**     37.878**   
Hausman 
test statistic     15.561**     18.213** 
Number of 
observations 
2626     2111     
 
Notes: Under the heading “demographics, policy, and financial development” the sample covers 132 
countries with data available between 1975 and 2004. Under the heading “capital account openness and 
corruption,” the sample covers 111 countries with data available between 1975 and 2004. The panel is 
unbalanced due to some missing observations. ** and * indicate 1% and 5% levels of significance, 
respectively. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are given in parentheses underneath coefficient 
estimates. For the fixed effects models, the F-test statistics are reported for the null hypothesis of the 
equality of the constants across all countries in the sample. For the random effects models, the Hausman 
test statistics test for the independence between the time-invariant country-specific effects and the 
regressors. 
 
Overall, the results suggest that capital account openness increases the equilibrium value 
of the currency. Financial deepening also has a positive effect. This result does not appear to be  
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the consequence of a spurious “credit boom” effect, since the “between” coefficient is more 
important than the “within” (or over time) coefficient.  
In Figure 11, we plot the time profile of the implied RMB undervaluation using the 
pooled OLS specification. The graphs show that a nominal undervaluation greater than one 
standard error starting 1994, the year China moved from a dual to a unified exchange rate 
arrangement. Nonetheless, the estimated degree of undervaluation is usually within the two 
standard error prediction band and is only slight outside the band in 2004. The actual RMB value 
is just outside the two standard prediction error bands at the very end of the sample period; in 
this instance the undervaluation is 76%. Apparently, the inclusion of these additional explanatory 
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Figure 11:  PPP-based real income, pooled OLS estimates with the demographics, policy and 
financial development as controls 
 
5.2  Capital Account Openness and Institutions 
  One oft-heard argument is that the Chinese economy is special –  namely it is one that is 
characterized by extreme corruption, as well as an extensive capital control regime. We 
investigate whether these two particular aspects are of measurable importance in the 
determination of exchange rates and, if so, whether our conclusions regarding RMB 
misalignment are altered as a consequence.  
                                                 
15   Although the use of a fixed effects model yields a much smaller misalignment in this, and 
the subsequent, case. These results are available upon request.  
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  We augment the basic real exchange rate-relative income relationship with the 
aforementioned Chinn-Ito capital account openness index. In addition we use the International 
Country Risk Guide’s (ICRG) Corruption Index as our measure of institutional development 
(where higher values of the index denote less corruption).  
  The results are reported in the second column of Table 6. Since the corruption index is 
very slow moving, with a small time-varying component, it does not make too much sense to 
look at the fixed effects and random effects estimates. Focusing on the pooled estimates from 
PPP-based output data, one observes that the per capita income coefficient is largely in line with 
the previous estimates. Similarly, capital account openness enters in positively, but not 
significantly. On the other hand, the (lack of) corruption enters in positively only when income is 
measured in PPP terms: The less corruption, the stronger the local currency.  
  We include an interaction term to allow for varying effects of capital openness in the 
presence of corruption. The estimates indicate that when capital account openness increases in 
absence of corruption, then the currency appreciates. This finding implies that when the capital 
account openness increases in the presence of relatively high levels of corruption, the 
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Figure 12: PPP-based real income, pooled OLS estimates with the capital account openness and 
institutions as controls  
 
When we examine the time profile of the implied RMB undervaluation under the current 
model specification, we find that the standard error bands are wider, and the estimated degree of 
undervaluation commensurately smaller (see Figure 12). In log terms, the undervaluation in 2004  
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is somewhat smaller than in the previous case, 72%. In other words, to the extent that lack of 
transparency is given at an instant, the RMB is still not undervalued at conventional levels of 
statistical significance.  
In sum, these control variables help explain a small portion of the estimated 
undervaluation reported in the previous section. However, when sampling uncertainty is taken 
into consideration, we still end up with the same inference: there is no strong and consistent 
statistical evidence of RMB misalignment in the recent sample period. Rather, the actual RMB 
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Figure 13:  PPP-based real income, pooled OLS estimates with the demographics, policy and 
financial development as controls, Prais-Winsten estimates 
 
It is also noted that, despite the added variables, serial correlation is again found in 
specifications considered in Section 5.1 and 5.2. Further, results from the Prais-Winsten 
procedure that controls for serial correlation give a much smaller estimate of RMB 
undervaluation. To illustrate the point, we plot the results based on the Prais-Winsten procedure 
in Figures 13 and 14. Indeed, the decline in the estimated degree of undervaluation is quite 
substantial.  The Prais-Winsten procedure yielded an estimated 4.2 % undervaluation compared 
with 76% in Figure 11 and an estimated 8.7 % undervaluation compared with 72% in Figure 12. 
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Figure 14: PPP-based real income, pooled OLS estimates with the capital account openness and 
institutions as controls, Prais-Winsten estimates  
 
6. Discussions 
  In the current debate regarding RMB valuation, some consider the large current account 
surplus a clear evidence of substantial RMB undervaluation. We recognize the contentious 
nature of the debate on the causes of, say, the US current account deficits with China and the 
related implications for exchange rate valuation. In Section 5, we included government deficit, 
financial deepening, and demographic variables in the list of explanatory variables to account for 
the effects of current account balances on exchange rates indirectly.
16  
As a robustness check, we also considered the direct effect of a current account balance 
variable. Specifically, the lagged value of the current account to GDP ratio relative to that of the 
US was added to all specifications presented thus far. To save space, we only report results 
pertaining to the two specifications considered in Section 5 to illustrate the point (see Table 7). 
The plots derived for the two specifications with the lagged current account variables are 
presented in Figures 15 and 16. In general, the current account balance variable is statistically 
significant but does not noticeably alter other coefficient estimates. One puzzling observation is 
that its sign changes across model specifications.
17 Comparing Figures 13 and 14 with Figures 15 
                                                 
16   The indirect approach avoids the technical issue of endogeneity. See, for example, Chinn 
and Prasad (2003) for determinants of current account balances. 
17   Apparently, the association between the current account and the real exchange rate is an unsettled 
issue. For example, Rogoff (1996, p. 663) points out that “from a theoretical perspective, virtually  
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and 16, we find that the inclusion of the current account balance variable does not change the 
inference of the degree of RMB undervaluation.  
 
Table 7: Estimation with control variables and a current account balance variable 
 
  Demographics, policy, and financial 
development 




















0.258**   
(0.014) 
0.246**   
(0.048) 
0.270**    
(0.039) 
0.275**     
(0.024) 
0.245**   
(0.011) 
0.215**   
(0.047) 
0.076
#      
(0.046) 




0.387**   
(0.041) 
0.412**   
(0.117) 
0.166**    
(0.060) 
0.227**      
(0.054)       
Population 
over 65 
0.364**   
(0.040) 
0.314*     
(0.146) 
0.275**    
(0.104) 
0.234**     
(0.087)       
Capital acct. 
openness 
0.147**   
(0.014) 
0.096      
(0.068) 
0.106**    
(0.016) 
0.114**     
(0.016) 
-0.014     
(0.039) 
0.042     
(0.218) 
0.037     
(0.034) 




0.000      
(0.000) 
0.000*     
(0.000) 
0.000      
(0.000) 
0.000     
(0.000)       
M2/GDP 0.379**     
(0.034) 
0.570**   
(0.158) 
0.200**    
(0.045) 
0.231**     
(0.045)       
Corruption       
0.239** 
(0.042) 
0.300     
(0.203) 
0.057
#     
(0.030) 
0.102**     
(0.032) 
Interaction 
term       



























-1.139**   
(0.087) 
-1.262**    
(0.252)    -0.768**     
(0.132) 
-0.449**   
(0.041) 
-0.569**   
(0.197)    -0.360**     
(0.058) 
Adjusted R
2  0.512  0.579   0.782   0.497   0.514  0.582  0.836   0.498 
F-test statistic      23.232**       36.907**   
Hausman 
test statistic      11.596*      114.62** 
Number of 
observations 
2244       1987      
 
Notes: Under the heading “demographics, policy, and financial development” the sample covers 132 
countries with data available between 1975 and 2004. Under the heading “capital account openness and 
corruption,” the sample covers 111 countries with data available between 1975 and 2004. The panel is 
unbalanced due to some missing observations. **, *, and # indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of 
significance, respectively. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are given in parentheses underneath 
coefficient estimates. For the fixed effects models, the F-test statistics are reported for the null hypothesis 
of the equality of the constants across all countries in the sample. For the random effects models, the 
Hausman test statistics test for the independence between the time-invariant country-specific effects and 
                                                                                                                                                             
any correlation between the current account and the real exchange rate can be easily 
rationalized.”    
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the regressors. The “Lagged current acct.” is the current account to GDP ratio lagged by one period.In 
passing, we would like to mention that China’s rapid international reserve accumulation is 
another oft-cited evidence of RMB undervaluation. That particular argument, however, may 
require additional analysis. Prasad and Wei (2005), for example, show that changes in the capital 
account, rather than the current account, contributed to China’s recent reserve buildup and, thus, 
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Figure 15:  The actual and predicted RMB values by pooled OLS estimates with the 
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Figure16: The actual and predicted RMB values by pooled OLS estimates with the capital 
account openness, institutions, and lagged current account as controls  
 
While the empirical results thus far point to the difficulty in establishing the claim that 
RMB is significantly undervalued, it is imperative to recognize that these results do not 
constitute evidence of no undervaluation. Indeed, the statistical evidence is so “weak” that we  
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cannot reject a wide range of hypotheses. For instance, we could not reject the null hypothesis 
that the RMB is 20% undervalued. In other words, the empirical relationship is very imprecisely 
estimated. That is, the empirical models and data are not sharp enough to allow a definite 
statistical conclusion. A corollary is that it is hard to formulate an adjustable-peg policy because 
it is hard to statistically establish evidence against a misaligned peg. 
Our bivariate estimation results identify 83 significant overvaluation cases and 78 
significant undervaluation cases. Most of these instances correspond to extreme political and 
economic conditions. Perhaps a reflection of the imprecision of the estimats, real exchange rates 
of Thailand in 1997 and Argentina in 2001 are not identified to be significantly misaligned.
18 
This imprecision appears not to be unique to the current exercise, even though it is often 
overlooked. Dunaway, Leigh, and Li (2006) make a similar observation from a different 
perspective. These authors, using the RMB as an example, show that equilibrium real exchange 
rate estimates obtained from the various approaches and models commonly used in the literature 
exhibit substantial variations in response to small perturbations in model specifications, 
explanatory variable definitions, and time periods. That is, inferences regarding misalignment are 
very sensitive to small changes in the way the equilibrium exchange rate is estimated. 
Data reliability makes the situation even murkier. The quality of data from, say, emerging 
markets is always a concern. Given its growing significance in the world economy, the reliability 
of China’s official data is a subject of intense debate. At the end of 2005, China revised its GDP 
figures after a year long nationwide economic census. Specifically, the 2004 figure was revised 
upward by 17%.
19 Thus, one has to interpret estimates of misalignment, including the ones 
reported in the current exercise, with great caution. 
 
7.  Summary and Some Concluding Thoughts 
In the current exercise, we undertake an objective evaluation of the thesis of RMB 
undervaluation using conventional empirical methods of inference. Anticipating the problems 
associated with using standard exchange rate models – including the FEER/BEER models 
                                                 
18   The bivariate estimation results indicate that a) the Thai baht was undervalued by 13.1% 
in 1996, and b) the Argentine peso was undervalued by 2.9% in 2001. On the other hand, results 
from the extended models considered in Section 5 show that the Argentine peso was overvalued 
by 12.1 % in 2001 while the Thai baht was undervalued. The finding of small deviations for the 
Thai baht is not atypical; see e.g. Chinn (2000b). 
19   The World Bank data used here do not incorporate this round of data revision.  
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commonplace in the practitioner literature – to explain exchange rate behavior of developing and 
transition economies, we opt to rely upon the more straightforward and robust relative price and 
relative output framework.  
We extend the existing literature along several dimensions. First, we analyze relative 
price and relative output relationship in a panel time-series cross-section framework in order to 
improve power, and so as to be able to trace out the time profile of misalignment measures. 
Second, we base our inferences on the property of misalignment estimates. In particular, we 
explicitly account for the effects of sampling uncertainty and serially correlated errors on our 
inferences regarding the extent of currency misalignment. Third, we examine the stability of the 
relative price and relative output relationship and the corresponding implications for the analysis 
of misalignments. 
  Under the basic specification and some of its variants, the RMB is found to be 
undervalued – a result that is consistent with the conventional wisdom. The result, however, does 
not survive a close scrutiny of the empirical evidence.  
One general observation is that, when one implements the standard operating procedure 
of accounting for sampling uncertainty in making inferences, there is no evidence supporting the 
claim that RMB is substantially undervalued, using conventional significance levels. Depending 
on the specification under examination, the actual RMB value is usually within one or two 
standard errors of its predicted level. Our inability to establish a convincing statistically 
significant result applies to most, if not all, the models and time periods under consideration. We 
also believe that our results accounting for serial correlation are extremely important, and bear 
upon the interpretation of the extant literature. With technical procedures controlling for serial 
correlation effects, the evidence for RMB undervaluation is substantially weakened. 
A by-product of our exercise is the finding that the relative price and relative output 
relationship is neither constant over time nor across country groups. The wide diversity of 
estimated output effects implies variously higher or lower misalignment estimates, but it does not 
alter the basic result that the RMB is not significantly different from its predicted equilibrium 
value. 
  It is also important to make it clear that we do not claim that the relative price and 
relative output relationship is the most appropriate framework for studying the RMB exchange 
rate behavior. Even though the framework we have adopted has certain advantages over some  
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standard exchange rate models in cross-country analysis that involves transitional and 
developing economies, more effort has to be made to capture the special features of these 
economies. The addition of several control variables suggested by the literature might be a good 
first (empirical) step in the right direction. However, we admit that a more elaborate theoretical 
framework would be very helpful in guiding future work. 
  For instance, the finding that capital account openness and (the lack of) corruption 
matters for the level of the exchange rate suggests that our understanding of when a currency is 
misaligned is highly circumscribed. Other factors that warrant attention include the large buildup 
of nonperforming loans and the structural weakness of the financial sector. These factors, 
combined with corporate governance and labor market rigidity, are likely to have significant 
implications for the equilibrium value of RMB which are not fully captured in the current 
exercise.  
It is worth repeating that our results highlight the difficulty of delivering a clear statistical 
evidence of RMB undervaluation, which is in accordance with the well-known result that it is 
quite difficult to model exchange rates in general. But these results do not necessarily mean that 
there is no undervaluation. 
In a broader perspective, the finding of a highly uncertain equilibrium real exchange rate 
buttresses the case for a prudent, cautious exchange rate policy that avoids abrupt changes in the 
Chinese economy. Given its limited financial market capacity and structural rigidity, an abrupt 
change in the Chinese exchange rate policy could lead to some significant challenges to 
economic growth and stability. The current Chinese measured approach to exchange rate regime 
liberalization, coupled with increasing imports and domestic consumption, might facilitate a 
resolution of global imbalances. However, in our view, this goal will only be achieved if 
combined with appropriate policy changes in other countries (e.g. the US).  
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Appendix: Data  and  Sources 
 
For Section 2: 
The nominal Renminbi exchange rate is the bilateral period average, expressed against the US$ 
(in $/f.c.u.), obtained from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics, and from Hali Edison, 
for the “adjusted” exchange rates (Fernald et al., 1999). The CPI’s are drawn from the CEIC 
database, extrapolated for 2004 and 2005 by using the CPI growth rates reported in IFS. The CPI 
deflated trade weighted exchange rate is drawn from IFS. 
 
For Section 3: 
The data for macroeconomic aggregates are drawn mostly from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators. These include demographic variables, per capita income and 
government deficits. Financial development indicators, including lending, stock and bond market 
capitalization, are drawn from the Beck et al. (2000). The capital controls index is from Chinn 
and Ito (2006).  The (inverse) corruption index is drawn from the International Country Risk 
Guide. Data for Taiwan are drawn from the Central Bank of China, International Centre for the 
Study of East Asian Development, and Asian Development Bank, Key Indicators of Developing 
Asian and Pacific Countries. For some variables, 2004 data are drawn from the IMF, World 
Economic Outlook (April) database.  
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